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RENO v. FLORES AND THE SUPREME 
COURT'S CONTINUING TREND 
TOWARD NARROWING DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS 
DENISE E. CHOQUETTE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the Supreme Court continues to acknowledge the existence 
of substantive due process rights, it has strictly limited the scope of 
those rights, in part by defining them as narrowly as possible. l In a 
recent case, Reno v. Flores,2 the Court has continued that trend by 
holding that the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) regu-
lation allowing for the detention of children prior to a determination 
of their deportability does not implicate the children's liberty right to 
be free from physical restraint.3 The Flores Court did not simply narrow 
that right; it eradicated the children's fundamental liberty interest and 
replaced it with the corollary, non-fundamental right to be released.4 
The detention scheme upheld in Flores, while providing for a more 
efficient system for the INS, harms undocumented immigrant chil-
dren, a doubly disenfranchised group.s This case clearly exemplifies 
the Court's trend toward narrowing substantive due process rights. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the particular factual and proce-
dural circumstances of the case Reno v. Flores so that the reader will 
have a greater appreciation of how far the Court has gone in narrowing 
substantive due process rights. Part III of this Note discusses the gen-
eral trend of the Court in the area of substantive due process adjudi-
cation, takes the general discussion and applies it to other recent cases 
which clearly exemplifY the Court's narrowing of substantive due proc-
ess rights and presents some general theories regarding the Court's 
* SENIOR ARTICLES EDITOR, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (biological father does not have 
constitutionally protected relationship with daughter); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
(upholding constitutionality of Georgia law against sodomy). 
2113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993). 
3 [d. at 1447. 
4 See id. 
5 The alien minor children are considered doubly disenfranchised because they are both 
minors and non-citizens under the law and do not have any way to defend themselves within the 
framework of our political system. 
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policies. Part IV presents an in-depth examination of Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion in Reno v. Flores, in addition to some discussion of 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and Justice Stevens's dissenting 
opinion. 
II. RENO V. FLORES: A CASE DESCRIPTION 
Reno v. Flores concerns the arrest and detention of children sus-
pected of being illegal aliens not yet found deportable.6 Jenny 
Lisette Flores was fifteen years old when she was detained by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service on suspicion of being a 
deportable alien.7 Flores was to remain in detention indefinitely 
pending her deportation hearing, pursuant to a new INS policy that 
allowed the release of juvenile aliens only to parents, close relatives, 
or legal guardians, absent a showing of unusual and compelling 
circumstances.s According to the complaint initially filed in this 
case, the original plaintiffs, including Jenny Lisette Flores, were all 
from El Salvador.9 Although Flores's mother was present in the 
United States, she refused to appear personally to accept physical 
custody of her daughter because she feared she herself would be 
taken into custody and deported to El Salvador where a civil war 
was raging. lo Flores was forced to remain in detention despite the 
fact that there were other adult members of her family willing to 
take custody of her,u 
According to Judge Fletcher, who wrote the dissent in the first 
Court of Appeals opinion,12 alien children were being held in deten-
tion by the INS for as long as two years in highly inappropriate condi-
tions out of a "professed" concern for their welfare.13 As pointed out 
by Judge Fletcher, when the case first came before the district court, 
the only requirement for institutionalizing a child was a determination 
by an INS agent, not a judge, that there was prima facie evidence of 
6 Reno v. Flores, II3 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1993). 
7 Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
8 Note, Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REv. 144, 175 (1993) (citing Telephone Interview with 
Carlos Holguin, Counsel for Respondents, General Counsel, Center for Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law (Sept. 28, 1993». 
9 Beth S. Rose, Note, INS Detention of Alien Minors: The Flores Challenge, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. 
LJ. 329, 331 (1986). 
10Id. at 331 (citing First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and 
Relief in the Nature of Mandamus, at II, Flores (filed Aug. 1985». 
II Rose, supra note 9, at 331-32. 
12Floresv. Meese, 934 F.2d 991,1014 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
13Id. (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
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the child's deportability.14 Upon such a "slender" showing, children 
were put into detention centers for indeterminate periods of time, 
deprived of education, recreation, and visitation, commingled with 
adults of both sexes, and subjected to strip searches with no showing 
of cause.15 Only after a suit was brought did the INS agree to modify 
the conditions of confinement and the treatment of the children 
during detention. 16 The district court approved a partial settlement 
whereby the INS agreed to provide education, reasonable visitation 
rights, and recreation, as well as to cease commingling detained minors 
with unrelated adult prisonersY Subsequently, without the agreement 
of the INS, the court ordered the INS to cease strip searching the 
children unless it had reasonable suspicion to believe they were con-
cealing weapons or contraband.18 
As Justice Stevens asserts in his dissent, the children detained 
pursuant to this regulation presented neither a risk of flight nor a 
threat of harm to themselves or to the community.19 These children 
had responsible third parties available to receive and care for them.20 
A. Procedural Background 
Plaintiffs are a class consisting of all persons under the age of 
eighteen years who have been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 125221 
by the INS's Western Region. 22 Because the children are persons pre-
sent in the United States, they must be afforded procedural protections 
in conjunction with any deprivation ofliberty.23 The Fifth Amendment, 
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects aliens from deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.24 Even an alien 
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory 
is entitled to that constitutional protection.25 
14Id. (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
15Id. (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
16Id. (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
17Id. (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
18Id. (Fletcher,]., dissenting). 
19 Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1457-58 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
20Id. at 1458 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
21 8 U.S.C. § 1252 provides for the apprehension and detention of aliens pending the 
resolution of deportation proceedings. It is not a criminal statute. 
22 Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
23 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
24Id. 
25Id. (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950)). 
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Congress has the power to determine what categories of aliens 
may lawfully reside in the United States and what categories must be 
deported.26 Congress has delegated the duties of administration of the 
immigration laws to the Attorney General, who oversees the work of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.27 
At present, only one relevant statutory provision addresses the 
release or detention of aliens between the time of their arrest and the 
determination of deportability or non-deportability. That statute is 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1). It provides: 
Pending a determination of deportability ... [an] alien 
may upon warrant of the Attorney General, be arrested and 
taken into custody .... [A]ny such alien ... may, in the 
discretion of the Attorney General and pending such final 
determination of deportability, (A) be continued in custody; 
or (B) be released under bond ... containing such condi-
tions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (C) be re-
leased on conditional parole.28 
In 1963, the Attorney General promulgated regulations which im-
plemented this statute. In effect, these provide that aliens, arrested 
on suspicion of deportability, could be released until further pro-
ceedings upon a determination that such release was appropriate, 
and under conditions determined by the INS.29 Upon request, an 
alien is entitled to a hearing before a disinterested officer to deter-
mine eligibility for release. 30 
In 1984, the Western Region of the INS adopted a separate policy 
for minors.31 That policy provided that minors would be released only 
to a parent or lawful guardian.32 In his memorandum implementing 
this policy, former Western Region Commissioner Harold Ezell stated 
that the limits on release were "necessary to assure that the minor's 
26 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
27 8 U.S.c. § 1103 (a) (1970 & Supp. 1994) (granting the Attorney General authority to 
"establish such regulations ... as he deems necessary" to administer and enforce the immigration 
laws). 
28 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1}. 
29 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(c} (2). 
30Id. 
3! Presently, juvenile aliens are detained in three sectors of the INS's Western Region: Los 
Angeles, San Diego, and El Centro. 
32 This policy was articulated in an unpublished memorandum by H. Ezell who was the 
Western Regional Commissioner at the time. Rose, supra note 9, at 330 (citing H. Ezell, Condition 
of Bond Release of Unaccompanied Minors (Sept. 6, 1984)}. 
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welfare and safety is maintained and that the agency is protected 
against possible legal liability. "33 The policy also provided for release to 
other responsible adults "in unusual and extraordinary cases, at the 
discretion of a District Director or Chief Patrol Agen t. "34 The Regional 
Commissioner did not justify this policy based on problems that had 
arisen under existing regulations.35 He neither cited any instances of 
harm which had befallen children released to unrelated adults, nor 
made any reference to suits that had been filed against the INS arising 
out of allegedly improper releases.36 It remained undisputed through-
out the litigation that the blanket detention policy was not necessary 
to ensure the attendance of children at deportation hearings.37 
Implementation of this policy38 sparked concern in a number of 
quarters39 because the policy resulted in the governmental detention 
of a large number of children who posed no apparent risk to the 
33 Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing unpublished memorandum). 
34Id. 
35Id. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
38 The regulation, which was codified during the course of the litigation at 8 C.F.R. 242.24, 
allows release to a broader category of adults than did the Western Region's policy. The regulation 
provides in relevant part: 
Detention and Release of Juveniles. 
(a) Juveniles. Ajuvenile is defined as an alien under the age of eighteen (18) years. 
(b) Release. Juveniles for whom bond has been posted, for whom parole has been 
authorized, or who have been ordered released on recognizance, shall be released 
pursuant to the following guidelines: 
(1) Juveniles shall be released, in order of preference, to: (i) A parent; (ii)legal 
guardian; or (iii) adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are 
not presently in INS detention; unless a determination is made that the detention 
of such juvenile is required to secure or to ensure the juvenile'S safety or that of 
others .... 
(4) In unusual and compelling circumstances and in the discretion of the district 
director or chief patrol agent, a juvenile may be released to an adult, other than 
those identified in paragraph (b) (1) of this section, who executes an agreement to 
care for the juvenile'S well-being and to ensure the juvenile'S presence at all future 
proceedings before the INS or an immigration judge .... 
(d) Detention. In the case of a juvenile for whom detention is determined to be 
necessary, for such interim period of time as is required to locate suitable placement 
for the juvenile, whether such placement is under paragraph (b) or (c) of this 
section, the juvenile may be temporarily held by INS authorities or placed in any 
INS detention facility having separate accommodations for juveniles. 
39 Various individuals and groups were among those who reacted adversely to the new policy. 
These include church groups, Amnesty International, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, 
International Human Rights Law Group, and Defense for Children International. Flores v. Meese, 
942 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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community and whose presence at their respective hearings could be 
ensured by responsible individuals.40 Rather than pointing to a specific 
issue regarding the administration of immigration laws affecting juve-
niles, the INS relied broadly on the "dramatic increase in the number 
of juvenile aliens" found unaccompanied by a parentY 
In promulgating the regulation, the INS recognized that the prin-
cipal factor bearing on release or detention is the likelihood of appear-
ance at future proceedings.42 It also recognized that the policy of 
preventing release to responsible adults was not related to the risk of 
flight issue or administration of any provision of the immigration 
laws.43 Its principal justification for the detention rule was the theory 
that unless the INS was able to do a comprehensive "home study" of 
the proposed custodian, the child's own interests would be better 
served by detention.44 In response to comments suggesting that release 
to responsible adults should be permitted on a regular basis, the INS 
stated that it did not have the resources or expertise necessary to make 
a determination, in each case, whether release to the adult in question 
would be in the child's best interests.45 
The plaintiffs, including named plaintiff Jenny Flores, filed their 
action on July 11, 1985, challenging the Western Region's policy re-
garding the release of minors then in effect.46 Their complaint raised 
seven claims, the first two challenging the Western Region's release 
policy on constitutional, statutory, and international law grounds, and 
the final five challenging the conditions of the juvenile'S detention.47 
These plaintiffs, who do not pose a risk of flight or harm to the 
community and have responsible third parties available to receive 
them, were being detained only because no adult relative or legal 
guardian was available to take custody of them.48 
4{J Id. 
41Id. (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 17,449 (May 17,1988». 
42 Id. at 1356. 
43Id. 
44 Id. (citing 53 Fed. Reg. at 17,449). It is interesting to note that there is no mention of a 
comprehensive study of the gross negligence and abuse in these detention centers. See Reno v. 
Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447-48 (1993). The Court continually notes the existence of the Juvenile 
Care Agreement, and the fact that if the conditions fall below those specified in the Juvenile Care 
Agreement then there is recourse in the federal courts. Id. at 1456 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
45 Flores, 942 F.2d at 1386. 
46 Id. at 1357. 
47Id. 
48 Justice Stevens makes much of this point in his dissent and he cites to the petitioners' oral 
arguments and to their briefs. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1457-58 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
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Just a week after the regulation took effect, in an unpublished 
order, the district court granted summary judgment to respondents 
and invalidated the regulatory scheme in three important respects.49 
First, the court ordered the INS to release "any minor otherwise eligi-
ble for release ... to his parents, guardian, custodian, conservator, or 
other responsible adult party. "50 Second, the order dispensed with the 
regulation's requirement that unrelated custodians formally agree to 
care for the juvenile, in addition to ensuring his or her attendance at 
future proceedings.51 Finally, the district court rewrote the related INS 
regulations regarding initial determinations of prima facie deportabil-
ity and release conditions. The court decreed that an immigration 
judge hearing on probable cause and release restrictions should be 
provided "forthwith" after arrest, whether or not the juvenile requests 
it.52 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed.53 The Ninth 
Circuit voted to rehear the case and selected an elevenjudge en banc 
court. That court vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district 
court order "in all respects. "54 
In 1992, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.55 Respon-
dents made three principal attacks on the INS regulation. 56 First, they 
asserted that because alien juveniles suspected of being deportable 
have a "fundamental" right to be "free from physical restraint," it is a 
denial of substantive due process to detain them.57 Further, the INS 
cannot prove that it is pursuing an important governmental interest in 
a manner narrowly tailored to minimize this restraint on liberty.58 
Second, respondents argued that the regulation violates their proce-
dural due process rights because it does not require the INS to deter-
mine with regard to each individually detained juvenile who lacks an 
appropriate custodian, whether his or her best interests lie in remain-
ing in INS custody or in release to "some other responsible adult. "59 
Finally, the respondents contended that even if the INS regulation 
49Id. at 1445 (citing Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-4544-RJK (Px) (C.D. Cal., May 25, 1988), 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a). 
50Id. (emphasis added). 
51Id. 
52Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a). 
53 Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1013 (9th Cir. 1990). 
54 Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1365 (9th Cir. 1991). 
55 Reno v. Flores, 112 S. Ct. 1291 (1992). 
56 For full text of the regulation, see supra note 38. 
57 Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1993). 
58Id. 
59Id. 
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infringes no constitutional rights, it exceeds the Attorney General's 
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1).60 
Whereas the Supreme Court continues to acknowledge the exist-
ence of substantive due process rights, it has strictly limited the scope 
of those rights, in part by defining them as narrowly as possible.61 The 
Court continued the trend in this case by finding that the INS's deten-
tion of alien children did not implicate the children's substantive due 
process right to freedom from physical restraint.62 The Court found 
that the right at stake was the right to be released to an unrelated adult 
and upheld the detention regulation under a mere rationality review.63 
Arguably, had the Court determined that a fundamental right was at 
stake, they would have applied "strict scrutiny" to the regulation and 
may have deemed it unconstitutiona1.64 
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ADJUDICATION 
One powerful constitutional strategy to protect persons from gov-
ernmental regulation is to identify important personal freedoms and 
60Id. The focus of this Note is on the respondents' constitutional claims. The Court only 
reached the constitutional issues because they determined that the statutory arguments failed. 
Id. The majority opinion does discuss the respondents' arguments regarding the Attorney Gen· 
eral's statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1). Respondents argue that the promulgation 
of the regulation was motivated purely by "administrative convenience." Id. at 1452. Justice Scalia 
concludes that because the regulation involves no deprivation of a "fundamental" right, it only 
has to be rationally related to the INS's stated policy reasons [welfare of the child). Id. Further, 
the INS was not compelled to look at other more expensive means of advancing its declared 
goals. See id. Respondents also argue that the INS regulation violates the statute because it relies 
on a "blanket" presumption of the unsuitability of custodians other than parents, close relatives, 
and guardians. Id. at 1453. They contend the Attorney General's exercise of discretion under 
§ 1252 (a) (1) requires "some level of individualized determination." Id. (citing INS v. National 
Center for Immigrants' Rights (NCIR), 112 S. Ct. 551, 558-59 (1991) (upholding INS regulation 
imposing conditions upon release». 
Justice Scalia thought it was sufficient that in the case of each detained alien juvenile, the 
INS make certain individual determinations, such as: Is there a reason to believe the alien is 
deportable? Is the alien under 18 years of age? Does the alien have an available adult relative or 
legal guardian? Id. at 1453. In Scalia's view, the particularization and individualization need go 
no further than asking those types of questions. Id. Lastly, respondents claim that the regulation 
is an abuse of discretion because it permits the INS to hold the juvenile indefinitely. Id. Scalia 
notes that this is not the case because the period of custody is inherently limited by the pending 
deportation hearing, which must be concluded with "reasonable dispatch" to avoid habeas corpus. 
Id. at 1453-54 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1». It is expected that the juvenile aliens will remain 
in custody only 30 days. Id. at 1454 (emphasis added). 
61 Note, supra note 8, at 174; see infra notes 66-77, and accompanying text. 
62 Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993). 
63 See id. at 1447-48. 
64 See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Consti-
tutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 314 (1993). 
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declare them "rights" with which the government may not interfere, 
even if the government seems to have a good reason for doing SO.65 
The Supreme Court's occasional willingness to recognize constitu-
tional rights not clearly tied to constitutional language or history is the 
most controversial aspect of the Court's performance.66 Historically, 
the vehicle for doing this has been the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.67 The Due Process Clause generates rights to 
administrative procedures, judicial review of administrative decisions, 
judicial procedures, and judicial remedies.68 The most familiar func-
tion of the Due Process Clause is to provide a guarantee of fair proce-
dure in connection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by 
a state.69 In addition, the substantive component protects individual 
liberty against "certain government actions regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them."70 
There is great confusion about the current state of the due process 
doctrine.71 Frequently, courts approach the substantive due process 
doctrine with wariness.72 In addition, the Supreme Court's recurrent 
efforts to shape due process law to promote policy ends has reduced 
doctrinal in tegri ty. 73 
In its most common form, substantive due process doctrine 
reflects the simple but far-reaching principle that government actions 
cannot be arbitrary.74 One view is that government officials must act 
on public-spirited rather than self-interested or disagreeable motiva-
tions, and there must be a "rational" or "reasonable" relationship 
between the government's ends and its means. 75 Given the potentially 
sweeping implications of a prohibition against governmental arbitrari-
65 DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S 
THIRD CENTURY 381 (1993). 
66Id. at 382. 
67" ... [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law ... " U.S. CaNsT. amend. XIV. 
68 Fallon, supra note 64, at 309. 
69 U.S. CaNST. amend. XlV. 
70 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
71 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992); Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("[s]ubstantive due process has at times been a treacherous 
field for this Court"). 
72 Fallon, supra note 64, at 309 (citing Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALEJ.L. 
& FEMINISM 189, 189 (1991) (noting "turmoil, contradiction, and instability" lying beneath 
surface of due process doctrine)). 
73 See id. 
74 [d. at 310. This principle is also embodied in the Equal Protection Clause which states "nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CaNsT. amend. 
XIV. 
75 Fallon, supra note 64, at 310. 
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ness and the tainted history of substantive due process adjudication, 
the Supreme Court has developed a variety of avoidance strategies.76 
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the 
concept of substantive due process because "guideposts for responsible 
decision-making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended. "77 
Under current law, there is uncertainty about which governmental 
decisions are subject to substantive due process claims and what con-
stitutional standards should apply. 78 
Substantive due process is considered the most controversial cate-
gory in constitutional law. 79 Since the celebrated case of Roe v. Wade,80 
all substantive due process cases that have reached the Supreme Court 
have involved challenges to the constitutionality of legislation.81 The 
Court, attempting to limit both the appearance and the danger of 
unrestrained judicial power, has often tried to make substantive due 
process jurisprudence fit into a simple, two-tiered framework. 82 Within 
this model, government intrusion on "fundamental" rights is subject 
to "strict scrutiny," a test sometimes formulated to inquire whether a 
burden is necessary to promote a "compelling state interest."83 By 
contrast, infringements of non-fundamental liberty and property inter-
ests are scrutinized only to ensure that the infringements are "ration-
ally related to legitimate government purposes. "84 
In terms of substantive due process adjudication, the guideposts 
that the Supreme Court does provide are "scarce and open-ended. "85 
Accordingly, judges have virtually unmitigated power to overturn the 
substantive judgments made by legislatures.86 
Under traditional doctrine, legislation affecting non-fundamental 
liberty and property rights need only have a "rational basis" to escape 
76 Rodney J. Blackman, Spinning, Squirreling, Shelling, Stiletting and other Stratagems of the 
Supremes, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 503, 504 (1993). 
77 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992) (citing Regents of University 
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985)). 
78 Fallon, supra note 64, at 312. 
79 See id. at 314. 
8°410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
81 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (upholding presumption 
created by Cal. Evid. Code that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a 
child of that marriage even if the husband is not the biological father); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 195-96 (1985) (upholding constitutionality of Georgia law against sodomy). 
82 Fallon, supra note 64, at 314. 
83 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
84 Fallon, supra note 64, at 314-15. 
85 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992) (citing Regents of University 
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985)). 
86 Note, Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163,211 (1992). 
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invalidation.87 The "rational basis test" reflects the principle that legis-
lation must seek to promote legitimate public purposes, not merely 
benefit one group over another, and that the government must pursue 
its ends by reasonable means.88 For the most part, the rational basis 
test is not demanding.89 There is a strong tendency on the part of the 
judiciary to review with deference all government actions that affect 
rights not protected by the Constitution.90 Under the apparent leader-
ship of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court 
has also given increased deference to governmental actions that have 
infringed upon what the Court has come to call "non-fundamental" 
rights.91 
In addition to Congressional legislation, the Court reviews agency 
interpretations of law with similar deference.92 The Court reverses the 
agency's decision only if the agency's actions have no rational basis.93 
The rationale behind this deference is that agencies deal in complex 
and narrow fields, and are better able to evaluate and weigh the 
competing policy interests in that field than is a generalist federal 
court. Therefore, pursuant to the Court's decision in Chevron, US.A., 
Inc. v. NRDC,94 it is an agency's exercise of its expert judgment-in a 
sufficiently authoritative manner-that warrants judicial deference. 
The difficulty in analyzing substantive due process under the two-
tiered process is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's creation of a 
mid-level tier.95 This tier rests somewhere between "strict scrutiny" and 
"rational basis" and has been applied to cases involving claims to avoid 
87 See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co. 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984); 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). 
88 Fallon, supra note 64, at 315-16 (citing cases). The rational basis test is applied equally in 
substan tive due process and equal protection cases. 
89Id. at 316 (citing cases). 
90 Note, supra note 86, at 211. 
91 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion of 
Scalia,].); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1985). 
92 The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE LJ. 511, 511 (1989). In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Justice Stevens, for an 
unanimous court, adopted an analytical approach that deals with the problem of judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretations oflaw. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The first question is whether 
Congress has directly spoken on the issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter. Id. at 842. If the intent is not clear, the question remains whether the agency's answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted). 
93 Scalia, supra note 92, at 513 (citing Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 
35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 
(1977» . 
94 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
95 See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
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confinement to mental institutions,96 to be permitted to travel,97 to 
resist unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,98 and to receive 
care and treatment while subject to governmental custody other than 
criminal incarceration.99 If judicial scrutiny is to reflect "tiered" assess-
ments of the fundamentality of interests, those implicated in these 
cases should probably be recognized as occupying an intermediate 
category, subject to something less than "strict scrutiny" but more than 
"rational basis" review.lOO This third tier has sometimes been called 
"somewhat heightened review. "101 
In determining what constitute "fundamental" rights, the Su-
preme Court has adopted an ad hoc or "intuitions" approach.102 Pre-
suming the constitutionality of government action, the Supreme Court 
will hold rules and legislation invalid as a matter of substantive due 
process only when it would be contrary to clear precedent,103 or if the 
government has behaved in a way that can be shown to be wrong by 
direct appeal to some moral intuition.104 
In terms of judicial precedent, the Court will attempt to identify 
the principles that best explain its past decisions and apply those 
principles consistently. lOS Often there will be more than one account 
of the legally controlling principles; therefore, the Court will take into 
96 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 567-68 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 
738 (1972). 
97 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965). 
98Riggins v. Harper, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814-15 (1992) (involving the rights of criminal 
defendants). 
99 City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983) (persons under 
arrest); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (persons in mental health institutions). 
100 Fallon, supra note 64, at 317. Since the Court has not adhered to its "two-tiered" approach, 
it should introduce a middle tier of scrutiny into its formal substantive due process framework. 
See id. 
101 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). This third tier has 
been applied in the equal protection context to cases involving classifications based on alienage, 
illegal residency, illegitimacy, gender, age, and mental retardation. Id. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) . 
102 Fallon, supra note 64, at 320 (citing John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 34-40 (1971». 
103 For a more detailed discussion regarding the role of precedent and doctrine, see Charles 
Fried, Commentary: Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1140, 1141-42 (1994). In his 
commentary on constitutional law, Professor Fried distinguishes between precedent and doctrine. 
Id. He asserts that if a court cites to a previous case as controlling and offers an explanation on 
why the prior decision justifies the result, the explanation is at least "the germ of a doctrine." Id. 
According to Professor Fried, doctrine consists of the rules and principles of constitutional law. 
Id. at 1140. 
104See Danieisv. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 
(1952) . 
105 Fried, supra note 103, at 1141-42. 
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account the rationale that best accords with their moral intuitions or 
those principles that they perceive society at large to share.106 In these 
cases, the Court generally renders judgments of unconstitutionality 
only when it finds that the government has behaved in a way that can 
be shown to be "conscience-shocking" or "arbitrary."107 Fair treatment 
by the Court of its own precedents is an indispensable condition for 
judicial integrity. lOS 
How the Court initially frames the issue is of paramount impor-
tance in substantive due process cases. The Court increasingly has 
limited the federal concept of "liberty" to specific constitutional guar-
antees and to the Roe v. Wadeo9 right to privacy, and perhaps to the 
framers' understanding of liberty as "freedom from physical re-
straint."llo 
A. Current Trend of the Court 
In recent cases, under the apparent leadership of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, the Court has strictly limited the scope 
of substantive due process rights. lll Justice Scalia is an originalistll2 and 
has expounded his theory of originalism in several opinions. Spe-
cifically, when he discusses unenumerated fundamental rights derived 
from the Due Process Clause, Scalia argues against the expansion of 
recognized substantive due process rights. ll3 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court clearly demonstrated its 
tendency toward narrowing substantive due process rights.1l4 In this 
case, the plaintiff argued that his due process rights were violated 
106 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 u.s. 186, 195-96 (1985). 
107 Daniels, 474 u.s. at 331 ("[t]he Due Process Clause ... was 'intended to secure the 
individual from arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'"); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (police 
pumping of the stomach of a criminal suspect to obtain evidence violated the Due Process Clause 
because it "shock[ed] the conscience."). 
108 Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and ''Property'', 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 424 (1977). 
109 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
110 Monaghan, supra note 108, at 424. 
111 United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2043--44 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). In 
Carlton,Justice Scalia went so far to say that he thought substantive due process was more like 
an "oxymoron" than a constitutional right. Id. 
112 David B. Anders, Note, justice Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between 
justice O'Connor and justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 
895,896-97 (1993). An originalist is someone who believes that the Constitution protects only 
those rights specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution or those rights that the 
Framers intended to protect. Id. at 897. 
113Id. at 898; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989). 
114 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6. 
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because he was denied a relationship with his biological child who was 
conceived while her mother was married to another man.1I5 Justice 
Scalia, who authored the plurality opinion, set out his theory of the 
proper approach to fundamental rights adjudication: "[i]n an attempt 
to limit and guide the interpretation of the [due process clause], we 
have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 
'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation is hard to objectify), but 
also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society."116 
Justice Scalia's quest to explain the parameters of our fundamental 
rights does not end with the identification of a tradition of protec-
tion. ll7 Arguably, any general tradition might protect a multitude of 
asserted liberty interests, and such a method would lead to the prolif-
eration of rights. 1I8 To limit the proliferation, Justice Scalia utilizes a 
notion of "levels of generality. "119 He argues that in selecting the level 
of generality at which to define a liberty interest, the Court should 
"refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, 
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."120 
The level of generality at which the Supreme Court defines liberty 
interests is important as it-in conjunction with the Court's definition 
of tradition-wholly determines whether the due process clause pro-
tects an asserted liberty interest. 121 In the Michael H. case, this narrow 
reading of tradition by Scalia led him to conclude that Michael and 
his biological daughter Victoria did not have a constitutionally pro-
tected parent-child relationship.122 If Scalia's plurality opinion had 
defined the scope of due process liberty as protecting established 
relationships between a father and his child, then Michael's due proc-
ess claim could have prevailed.123 
115 The plaintiff is this case claimed that his due process rights were violated by the presump-
tion created by CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 621 (West Supp. 1989) that a child born to a married 
woman living with her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage. ld. at 113. The plaintiff 
had sought to establish his paternity of the child born to the wife of another, but the Court denied 
his claim because the presumption created by § 621 can only be rebutted by the husband or wife. 
ld. 
116Id. at 122. 
117 Edward Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental 
Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE LJ. 1337, 1338 (1990). 
118Id. 
119 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6. 
120ld. at 127-28 n.6. 
12l Spitko, supra note 117, at 1338. 
122 491 U.S. at 130-3l. 
123 See Spitko, supra note 117, at 1339. 
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Another example of the Court narrowly defining what constitutes 
a liberty interest can be found in Bowers v. Hardwick. 124 In this case, the 
Court framed the decisive issue as whether the Constitution protected 
"a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. "125 The dissent, 
as well as numerous commentators, argued that the case's actual un-
derlying concern was "the fundamental interest all individuals have in 
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others. "126 
Arguably, this is a different issue than the one considered by the Court. 
Had this been the decisive issue, the Court may have recognized the 
plaintiffs due process claim.127 In the past, the Court recognized that 
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance."128 Bowers v. Hardwick fits better under a "right to privacy" 
analysis than a "right to commit homosexual sodomy" analysis. But the 
Court, because of its perceived view of the "traditions" of our society,129 
was unwilling to take a more expansive view of its authority to discover 
new fundamental rights in the due process clause.13o 
This narrowing trend of the Court fits well with Justice Scalia's 
views regarding judicial review. He is primarily concerned with 'Judicial 
activism" undermining the legitimacy of the Court,l3l and has urged 
the adoption of his approach to fundamental rights adjudication as a 
means to avoid arbitrary decision-making by jurists. 132 Justice Scalia's 
desire to limit substantive due process rights is clearly demonstrated in 
the case Reno v. Flores, which was decided in the 1992-93 term. 
124 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
1251d. at 191. 
1261d. at 206 (Blackmun, j., dissenting). The majority and the dissent argue over how 
abstractly to describe the right at issue. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality 
in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. lO57, lO66 (1990). The majority describes the right 
narrowly, the dissent broadly. ld. These characterizations are the "starting points" for the analysis. 
ld. Because the majority and the dissent ask different questions, they come up with different 
answers. ld. 
127 See Roe v. Wade, 4lO U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to privacy in the 
determination of whether or not to abort a fetus); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 
(1965) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) ("right to privacy, no less important than 
any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people"». 
128 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
129The Court cited the ancient roots of proscriptions against sodomy and listed all of the 
states that had statutes against sodomy still in effect. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. 
130 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. 
131 Spitko, supra note 117, at 1343. 
132 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989). In Scalia's plurality opinion he 
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B. justice Scalia's Majority Opinion 
Respondents' substantive due process claim relied on the Court's 
line of cases which interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' 
guarantee of "due process of law." According to these cases,133 due 
process includes a substantive component forbidding the government 
from infringing on certain "fundamental" liberty interests, no matter 
what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest.134 In keeping with the general 
narrowing trend, the Court in Flores declined to find that a "funda-
mental" right was in question.135 
Justice Scalia, consistent with his originalist approach, diminished 
the respondents' substantive due process claim.136 He stated that the 
"freedom from physical restraint" invoked by the respondents was not 
at issue in this casey7 Instead, he reasoned that the right at issue was 
the "alleged right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, 
or legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be 
placed in the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather 
than of a government-operated or government-selected child-care in-
stitution. "138 Scalia further observed that the children were not being 
restrained "in the sense of shackles, chains, or barred cells ... "139 and 
that ')uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. "140 
Scalia narrowly defined the right at issue so as to assure that the 
conclusion that he was looking for would naturally follow. l41 In particu-
lar he stated that "the Court does not recognize a child's constitutional 
also quotes Justice White's dissenting opinion in the case Moore v. City of East Cleveland, in which 
he states, "[tlhe Judiciary, including [the Supreme Court], is the most vulnerable and comes 
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution." Id. at 122 (citing 431 
U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White,]., dissenting)). 
133 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992); United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (1986). 
134 Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993). According to Justice Stevens in his dissent, 
the Court glosses over the history of the litigation. Id. at 1459 (Stevens,]., dissenting). He feels 
that the history "speaks mountains about the bona fides of the Government's assertedjustification 
for its regulation. Id. at 1459 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
135 Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447. 
136Id. 
137Id. 
138Id. 
139Id. 
14°Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)). 
141 See id. 
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right not to be placed in a decent and humane custodial institution if 
there is available a responsible person unwilling to become the child's 
legal guardian but willing to undertake temporary legal custody. "142 
The manner in which Scalia chose to define the liberty interest is 
indicative of the outcome he was striving to achieve. 143 He states further 
that "the mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that 
'substantive due process' sustains it; the alleged right certainly cannot 
be considered 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental."'144 
By framing the issue to avoid the "fundamental right" question, 
Scalia was able to conclude that the detention scheme was rationally 
connected to a governmental interest in preserving and promoting the 
child's welfare and was not excessive in relation to that valid purpose.145 
Because the detention regulation did not implicate a "fundamental 
right," the children's due process did not require narrow tailoring to 
"minimize the denial of release into private custody. "146 The impair-
ment of this lesser interest demands no more than a "reasonable fit" 
between governmental purpose and the means chosen to advance that 
purpose.I 47 This leaves ample room for the INS to decide that admin-
istrative factors such as lack of child-placement expertise justify using 
one means rather than another. I48 In other words, according to Scalia, 
there is no need to consider whether private placement is better when 
institutional placement is "good enough."149 Had the Court applied 
"strict scrutiny," "good enough" would not have justified the INS regu-
lation. I50 
Although Scalia does not doubt the constitutionality of institu-
tional custody of juveniles, he distinguishes between the institutional 
custody of alien juveniles and citizen juveniles. l5l Consistent with his 
deference to Congress, he notes that the regulation of aliens has been 
142 Id. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (quoting Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934»). 
145 Id. at 1448. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1448-49. 
148 Id. at 1449. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151 See id. at 1449. Scalia states that Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens. Id. 
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committed to the political branch and that over no other subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete. I52 
The Flores Court did more than simply continue the Court's nar-
rowing trend in the area of substantive due process rights. Justice 
Scalia's characterization of the issue at stake in Flores as the right to be 
released to unrelated adults, rather than a right to physical liberty, 
replaced the negative liberty right not to be detained with its corollary 
affirmative right to be released once detained. I53 Perhaps the most 
shocking aspect of the Flores case is that this inversion took place in 
the realm of physical liberty, the essence of the Due Process Clause. 1M 
The Court has held that the government's regulatory interest can 
outweigh an individual's liberty interest in the appropriate circum-
stances. I55 For example, there is no absolute constitutional barrier to 
detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deporta-
tion hearings. I56 Nor is there a constitutional barrier to the detention 
of mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the publicI 57 
and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand trial. I5S 
In the area of juvenile justice, the Court has approved post-arrest, 
pre-trial detention only for juveniles deemed to pose a continuing 
danger to the community.I59 In Schall v. Martin, the Court upheld the 
New York Family Court Act which authorizes pretrial detention of an 
accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a "serious 
risk" that the child "may before the return date commit an act which 
if committed by an adult would constitute a crime. "160 What distin-
guishes Flores from Schall is the fact that the alien juveniles who are 
detained pose no risk to the community, nor is there a risk of flight. I61 
Moreover, in Schal~ there is a determination made on an individual 
basis as to whether or not the juvenile delinquent is likely to commit 
a crime, whereas in Flores, there are no individual hearings. I62 
Justice Scalia's jurisprudence reflects a belief that narrowing the 
definition of substantive due process rights is necessary to prevent 
152 Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. 
v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909»). 
153Note, supra note 8, at 180. 
154 Id. 
155United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 747, 748 (1987). 
156 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,537-42 (1952). 
157 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
158Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 73S-39 (1972). 
159 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 273-74 (1984). 
160 Id. at 255. 
161 Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct 1439,1457-58 (1993) (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
162 Id. at 1453. 
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subjective decision-making on the part of the judiciary.163 But analyzing 
his reasoning in the Flores case leads to the conclusion that he himself 
participates in subjective decision-making. l64 This conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact that freedom from physical restraint has long been 
considered the core of the Due Process Clause. Without much regard 
for this fact, Justice Scalia minimizes the children's liberty interest.165 
The Court specifically noted in United States v. Salerno that it recog-
nized the importance and fundamental nature of a right to liberty.166 
Because of his own views regarding how the Court should address 
substantive due process adjudication, Scalia ignored the liberty inter-
ests of the children, arguably the heart of the case, and created instead 
his own version of their "fundamental rights."167 
In its most common form, substantive due process doctrine 
reflects the simple proposition that government cannot be arbitrary 
and that government officials must act with public-spirited rather than 
self-interested motives.168 In this case, for the sake of administrative 
ease, the government-the INS-is allowed to virtually ignore the alien 
juveniles' fundamental interest in being free from physical restraint. 169 
Although Justice Scalia and Justice Rehnquist support deference to 
decisions by the legislature and by governmental agencies,170 it would 
have been appropriate in this case for the Court to have considered 
163 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989). 
164 Justice Scalia in his opinions has repeatedly asserted that the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees no substantive rights. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2041-42 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). This is based on his own views regarding how to interpret the Constitution and as 
such is a subjective opinion not based on legal precedent because, in the past, the Court has 
recognized unenumerated substantive due process rights. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (recognizing constitutionally protected relationship between grand-
parent and grandchild); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing right to 
marital privacy). 
165 See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447. 
166United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 740, 751 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in 
Salerno that "[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention the carefully limited exception." 
ld. at 755. 
167 See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447. One commentator refers to this type of Supreme Court 
decision-making as "[i]f we apply my rules, I win." Rodney J. Blackman, supra note 76, at 523. 
This stratagem is not complicated. The Justice writing the Court's opinion decides to set up the 
legal problem so that the conclusion logically follows from the premise(s). ld. The Justice simply 
chooses a particular premise, rather than some equally (or more) applicable premise, because 
the Justice knows that the conclusion he desires will follow from his chosen premise. ld. This is 
exactly what Scalia has done in the Flores case. In fact, he considered only information that he 
considered relevant and abstracted away information that other jurists might consider essential. 
Note, supra note 8, at 183. 
168Fallon, supra note 64, at 310. 
169 See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447. 
170 Scalia, supra note 92, at 511. 
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more seriously the regulations' justifications, given the government's 
articulated motivations. l7l Class legislation in the past has been sub-
jected to "strict scrutiny."172 Because the INS regulation gives blanket 
approval for the detention of all alien juveniles who do not have a 
parent, close relative, or legal guardian available to take custody of 
them, this regulation should be subjected to strict scrutiny as well.173 
In Salerno, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes "[iJn our society, liberty is the 
norm, and detention the carefully limited exception."174 The majority 
in Flores goes to great lengths to deny liberty to children whose only 
possible offense is their alienage. 175 
C. Concurring opinion 
Justice O'Connor does not take as narrow a view of the juvenile 
aliens' "liberty" interests in the Flores case as Justice Scalia. 176 Justice 
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Souter joined.177 
In her view, the children did have a constitutionally protected interest 
in freedom from institutional confinement. 178 Justice O'Connor con-
curs with the majority, however, because in her view the challenged 
regulation complies with the requirements of due process.179 She states, 
"[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmen-
tal action."180 Justice O'Connor asserts that freedom from physical 
restraint means more than freedom from handcuffs, straigackets, or 
detention cells. l8l A person's core liberty interest is also implicated 
when she is confined in a prison, a mental hospital, or some other 
form of custodial institution.182 
Justice O'Connor views the central issue as whether a governmen-
tal decision implicating a squarely protected liberty interest comports 
with substantive and procedural due process.183 In her assessment, the 
171 See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1443-44. 
172 Strict scrutiny of racial classifications as a standard of review was formalized by the 
Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
173 See id. 
174 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 740, 755 (1987). 
175 Flores v. Meese, F.2d 991, lO14 (1990) (F1etcher,]., dissenting). 
176 Reno v. F1ores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1454. (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
177Id. (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
178Id. (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
179Id. (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
180 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992). 
181 Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1454 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
182Id. (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
183Id. at 1456 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
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absence of available parents, close relatives, or legal guardians to care 
for respondents, when combined with the Juvenile Care Agreement,184 
explains why the INS program survives heightened, substantive due 
process scrutiny. ISS She accordingly asserts that it is rationally con-
nected to a governmental interest in "preserving and promoting the 
welfare of the child. "186 
Justice O'Connor seems to place too much emphasis on the Juve-
nile Care Agreement without even considering the reason that the 
"Agreement" was necessary in the first place.187 The complete absence 
of evidence justifYing the policy change initially, and the conditions in 
which the children were being detained, are reasons enough to ques-
tion the motives of the government in implementing this policy.188 The 
stated policy reason was that detention was necessary to insure the 
minors' safety and well-being, but this could not be true given the fact 
that the Juvenile Care Agreement was negotiated after the implemen-
tation of the policy change. How could a reasonable person believe 
that the detention of these children in deplorable conditions was in 
their best interests?189 Had Justice O'Connor given further thought to 
the true policy reasons behind the change, she might have concluded 
that even the absence of parents, close relatives, or legal guardians was 
not sufficient justification for the detention of the children. 
184 After the commencement of the lawsuit, the INS agreed to modify the conditions of 
confinement and the treatment of the children during detention. Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 
1014 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher,]., dissenting). This included providing education, reasonable 
visitation rights, and recreation. Id. It also provided that the INS cease commingling detained 
minors with unrelated adults. Id. In addition, without the agreement of the INS, the court ordered 
the INS to stop subjecting the minors to strip searches. Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 666 
(C.D. Cal. 1988). 
185Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1456 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
186Id. (O'Connor,]., concurring). Justice O'Connor specifically notes that the regulation 
does not violate substantive due process because the conditions of government custody are decent 
and humane and because a parent, close relative, or legal guardian was not available. Id. 
187 See id. (O'Connor,]., concurring) . Judge Fletcher, in her dissent in Flores v. Meese, detailed 
the conditions under which these children were living. 934 F.2d 991,1014 (1990). According to 
Judge Fletcher, the children were being held by INS for as long as two years in highly inappro-
priate conditions out of concern for their welfare. Id. When the case first came before the court, 
the only requirement for detention was a determination by an INS agent-not a judge-that 
there was prima facie evidence of the child's deportability. Id. Upon such a showing, the children 
were put into "detention centers" for indeterminate periods of time, deprived of education, 
recreation, and visitation, commingled with adults of both sexes and subjected to strip searches 
with no showing of cause. Id. 
188 Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens,]., dissenting). As Justice Stevens notes, if the deplorable 
conditions prevailed when the litigation began, we must assume that the Western Regional 
Commissioner was familiar with them when he adopted his "allegedly benevolent" policy. Id. at 
1460 n.10. 
189Id. at 1460 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
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D. justice Stevens's Dissent 
In Justice Stevens's view, the majority opinion in the Flores case 
virtually obliterates the juvenile aliens' substantive due process rights.190 
He begins his dissent with a scathing criticism of the Court's majority 
opinion. l9l As long as the conditions of detention are "good enough," 
the INS is justified in "declining to expend administrative effort and 
resources to minimize ... detention."192 In his view, an agency's inter-
est in minimizing administrative costs is a patently inadequate justifica-
tion for the detention of harmless children even when the conditions 
of detention are "good enough. "193 Justice Stevens notes that the INS 
made no comment at all about the uniform body of professional 
opinion that recognizes the harmful consequences of detention of 
juveniles.194 
Justice Stevens agrees with Justice O'Connor that respondents 
"have a constitutionally protected interest in freedom from institu-
tional confinement ... [that] lies within the core of the Due Process 
Clause. "195 He notes that the Court said as much last term in the case 
of Foucha v. Louisiana.196 He disagrees with Justice O'Connor's conten-
tion that the Court does not hold otherwise.197 Because the children 
at issue are being confined in government-operated or government-se-
lected institutions, their liberty has been curtailed. Yet, the Court 
defines that right as merely "the alleged right of a child who has no 
available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the 
government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-
190 See id. at 1460-61 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
191 Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. Id. at 1486. 
192Id. at 1456 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (quoting Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1449, 1452-53). 
193Id. at 1456 (Stevens,]., dissenting). In fact, Justice Stevens states that at the time the 
Western Region adopted its new policy, the conditions of confinement were "deplorable." Id. at 
1460 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3). When discussing the possible motives of the INS 
in instituting its new policy, Justice Stevens notes that when the undocumented parents came to 
pick up their children, they were immediately arrested and deportation proceedings were insti-
tuted against them. It is possible that the true motivation of detaining the children was more 
related to enforcement proceeding than to the "best interest" of the children. See id. at 146l. 
194Id. at 1462 n.19 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (citing the Department of Justice's own Standards 
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice that describe "the harsh impact that even brief detention 
may have on ajuvenile, especially when he/she is placed in a secure facility, and the correspond-
ing need to assure as quickly as possible that such detention is necessary." UNITED STATES DEPT. 
OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 299, 304 (1980». 
195Id. at 1467 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
196 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992) ("[fJreedom from bodily restraint has always been at the 
core of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary government action"). 
197 Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1467. (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
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able custodian rather than a government-operated or government-se-
lected child-care institution. "198 
In Justice Stevens's view, the Court's analysis is simply wrong. l99 
The right at stake is not the right of detained juveniles to be released 
to one particular custodian rather than another, but the right not to 
be detained in the first place.2°O He argues that it is the government's 
burden to prove that detention is necessary, and not the individual's 
burden to prove that release is justified.20l Justice Stevens called the 
narrow reading of the right in question "the linchpin in the Court's 
analysis."202 This narrow reading contradicted the constitutional prin-
ciple that it is the government's burden to show the necessity of 
detention.203 Central to his contention that this is a constitutional 
premise is the Court's holding in the cases United States v. Salerno and 
Foucha v. Louisiana.204 
In Salerno, the Court conceded that it was the "general rule" that 
the government not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a 
criminal trial.205 They noted, though, a number of exceptions to that 
general rule.206 However, even in the exceptional cases, the govern-
ment has the burden of showing that the detention is necessary for 
either public safety reasons or for regulatory reasons such as risk of 
flight.207 The Court explains that it recognizes an individual's strong 
interest in liberty and that it does not intend, by its holding, to mini-
mize the importance and fundamental nature of this right.208 
Salerno can easily be distinguished from Flores, because the defen-
dant in Salerno was provided with greater procedural guarantees.209 In 
198Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting) (citing Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447). 
199 Id. at 1468 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
200 Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
201Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
202Id. at 1470 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
203 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992) (finding due process violation when 
individual who is detained on grounds of dangerousness is denied right to adversary hearing in 
"which State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is demonstrably dangerous to 
the community"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (finding no due process 
violation when detention is necessary to prevent flight or danger to community). 
204 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (involving pre-trial detention); 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (involving 
commitment to mental institution). 
205 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 ("[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial 
or without trial is the carefully limited exception."). 
206 Id. 
207Id. The Court upheld the detention prior to trial of the defendant in the Salerno case 
because it viewed the detention imposed by the Bail Reform Act as regulatory in nature, and that 
the defendants posed a significant risk to society. Id. at 747-48. 
208Id. at 750. 
209 Id. at 742 (the arrestee may request the presence of counsel at the detention hearing, he 
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Flores, the INS was not obligated to hold individual hearings for each 
minor, whereas in Salerno, the State had the burden of showing by clear 
and convincing evidence that each defendant posed a continuing risk 
to society.210 
Although Foucha did not involve the issue of pre-trial detention, 
the Court noted that in certain narrow circumstances persons who 
pose a danger to others or to the community may be subject to limited 
confinement.211 In Foucha, the State failed to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous.212 
Again, the distinguishing factor between Foucha and Flores is the lack 
of procedural safeguards provided to the alien children.213 
Justice Stevens concluded that the INS does have a legitimate 
interest in the safety of the alien children, but that the detention 
scheme was not "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest because it 
relied on a blanket presumption that children's interests would be 
better served in the government's custody.214 At the very least, Justice 
Stevens argues, pursuant to the Court's previous decisions,215 the gov-
ernment should decide on "an individual basis" whether governmental 
custody is best for the child's welfare.216 
IV. CONCLUSION 
By defining rights narrowly and protecting only those rights that 
have been historically recognized, the Court particularly disadvantages 
minority groups. The Flores Court's narrowing of the asserted right to 
be free from physical restraint provides a chilling example of this 
trend. The Flores Court focused on the particular distinguishing attrib-
utes of the detainees that would allow the justices to conclude that a 
fundamental liberty interest was not implicated. They did not acknow-
ledge the abundance of precedent that held against detention prior to 
may testity and present witnesses on his or her behalf, as well as proffer evidence, and he may 
cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing). 
210 Compare Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1468-69 (1993) with Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742. 
211 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992). 
2121d. 
213 See Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1446-47 (1993). 
2141d. at 1468-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
215 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 
(1987). 
216Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1469 n.30. It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens, in a footnote, 
observes that the Court in its majority opinion did not make reference to the infamous case 
Korematsu v. United States, in which the Court upheld a blanket exclusion from particular 
"military areas" of all persons of Japanese ancestry without a determination as to whether any 
particular individual actually posed a threat to the United States. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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adjudication, except for instances in which the detainees pose a risk 
to the community. By focusing on attributes that distinguish groups 
rather than focusing on the common traits among groups, the Court 
will continue to deny protection to "new" rights simply because they 
have not historically been protected. Thus, the Court ensures contin-
ued denial of protection to historically marginalized groups. As a result 
of Flores, children as young as five years of age, with responsible adults 
available to care for them, are still being confined under prison-like 
conditions in INS camps and lock-up facilities. 

